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Abstract 
 
We examine the relation between firm reputation and the cost of debt financing. We posit that 
corporate reputation represents “soft information” not captured by balance sheet variables, which 
is nonetheless valuable to lenders. Using Fortune magazine’s survey of company reputation, we 
find an inverse relation between a company’s reputation and its bond credit spreads. We also find 
that firms with high reputation face less stringent covenants and are less likely to be the target of 
SEC fraud investigations. Further testing shows that bad reputation is a good ex ante predictor of 
corporate failure. Our study provides evidence that firm reputation is an important consideration 
in the pricing of corporate public debt. 
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1. Introduction 
Prior research has demonstrated the role that reputations play in mitigating agency problems 
between principals and agents. The literature has shown that reputations emerge from 
information asymmetries (Milgrom and Roberts 1982). Asymmetric information about a player’s 
true type gives rise to reputation, a formalized belief about the player’s type based upon their 
past actions.  In their seminal work on repeated games, Milgrom and Roberts show that players, 
through their actions, can shape their reputations. By taking actions that are in the principal’s 
interests even without a formal or explicit contract, a player can develop a reputation for a 
certain characteristic that helps reduce agency problems and increase payoffs at a later stage.
1
  
Since it is costly to build and maintain, a “good” reputation must allow a player to earn future 
rents. Theoretical literature in economics predicts that firms with higher reputations will enjoy 
rents in the form of access to capital markets at relatively lower cost (Diamond 1989 and 1991). 
Because a good reputation serves as a signal that the company will take actions consistent with 
investors’ interests, a company that acts to enhance its reputation is rewarded by investors with a 
lower cost of capital. Empirical evidence supporting this prediction, however, is limited. The 
only direct research to date comes from Cao, Myers, Myers, and Omer (2014), who document a 
negative association between firm reputation and the cost of equity.
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In this paper, we extend the literature by examining the relation between firm reputation and 
the cost of capital from a different perspective, namely that of bondholders. In doing so, we 
attempt to answer the following two main questions: (i) Is firm reputation priced in the debt 
market, and (ii) if so, what are the channels through which firm reputation affects the cost of 
debt. To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical research on this topic. The closest 
studies focus on a company’s relationship with its employees. Bauer, Derwall and Hann (2009) 
find that firms with strong employee relationships enjoy a lower cost of debt and higher bond 
ratings. Similarly, Verwymeren and Derwall (2010) show that employee well-being is associated 
with higher credit ratings. But while employee relationships may constitute one aspect of firm 
                                                 
1
 For example, a player might take actions counter to their short-term interests, such as offering money back 
guarantees or engaging in socially responsible activities, to establish a reputation for acting in both parties’ long-
term interests instead of opportunistically (see e.g., Mailath and Samuelson 2001). 
2
 Recent indirect research examining firm reputation and the cost of equity include Edmans (2011), Anginer and 
Statman (2010), and Jones, Jones and Little (2000). 
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reputation, the reputation of a company encompasses several dimensions (e.g., quality of 
product, innovation, financial soundness etc.). Using scores from Fortune magazine’s “most 
admired companies” survey, we find an inverse relation between a company’s reputation and its 
bond credit spreads. We also find that firms with high reputation face less stringent covenants 
and are less likely to be the target of SEC fraud investigations. Further testing suggests that 
reputation is a good ex ante predictor of corporate failure. Overall, our study provides evidence 
that firm reputation represents “soft information” that is nonetheless valuable to lenders.  
We begin our analyses by examining the association between the firm’s reputation and its 
credit yield spread. We argue that since bondholders have limited upside potential in their 
investment, they have different demands for numerous attributes of accounting information 
(Armstrong, Guay, and Weber 2010), and especially for financial reporting quality. This issue is 
important because debt contracts generally include clauses and covenants that are often based on 
reported financial statement variables (e.g., balance sheet leverage and earnings-based interest 
coverage ratios), and where violations are triggered by decreases in the value of the firm. These 
violations allow lenders to dictate future managerial actions including major financing and 
investment decisions. Therefore, better financial reporting quality provide for better debt 
valuation since it leads to accurate revisions of book value of assets, liabilities, equity, and 
earnings, and therefore precise violations of financial covenants (Ball, Robin, and Sadka 2008).  
We posit that reputable firms will provide quality financial reporting leading to a lower cost 
of debt financing. In line with this argument, Cao, Myers, and Omer (2012) examine the 
association between firm reputation and financial reporting quality and find a negative relation 
between reputation and the likelihood of misstatements. They find that companies with higher 
reputations are less likely to misstate their annual financial statements, report less extreme 
discretionary accruals, and are willing to pay higher audit fees, evidence consistent with the idea 
that higher-reputation companies produce higher-quality financial statements. Financial reporting 
quality is also an outcome of better corporate governance and better business decisions (Dechow, 
Sloan, and Sweeney 1996; Klein 2002; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008). Further, a fundamental 
benefit of reputation is that it reduces the confidence interval around hard (quantifiable) information 
estimates, thereby increasing creditor reliance on publicly available accounting statements (Reeb and 
Roth 2014). 
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Next, we examine the channels through which firm reputation affects the cost of debt. 
Specifically, we investigate the relation between firm reputation and three channels: debt 
covenants, SEC enforcement actions, and default probability. First, shareholders can expropriate 
bondholder wealth by liquidating the firm’s assets and distributing them to shareholders, 
undertaking risky projects after the issuance of debt, under-investing, and diluting existing 
bondholders’ claims through the issuance of new debt with higher seniority.  The agency theory 
of covenants suggests that rational debt holders aware of such conflicts will require a premium 
for holding the firm’s debt.  As a result stockholders will bear these costs ex-ante and will use 
debt covenants to limit management’s ability to expropriate wealth from bondholders in an 
attempt to reduce the firm’s cost of debt (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Smith and Warner 1979; 
Bradley and Roberts 2004).  
Prior literature has identified certain company characteristics that lead to more intense 
covenant use. Malitz (1986) finds that the covenant use decreases with the size of the firm and 
increases with existing leverage ratio. Begley (1994) shows that firms with higher default 
probabilities, fewer assets in place and that generate small amounts of operating cash flows use 
covenants to restrict dividend payments and additional borrowing. Bradley and Roberts (2004) 
find that cash flow volatility is an important determinant of covenant intensity and interpret this 
as evidence of the relevance of financial health and asymmetric information in the contracting 
decision process. Therefore, based on the agency theory of covenants we expect that more 
reputable firms will face fewer covenant restrictions.  
Second, we examine whether a firm’s reputation is related to SEC enforcement actions due to 
fraud. We conjecture that reputation is a valuable asset that firms attempt to preserve by avoiding 
actions that reduce its value.  In particular, Karpoff and Lott (1993) and Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 
(2008) show that reputational costs of corporate fraud are large and constitute most of the costs 
incurred by firms accused or convicted of fraud.  Chava, Huang and Johnson (2014) show that 
firms that misreport financial information pay higher loan spreads for at least six years following 
disclosure of misreporting. Therefore, we test whether firms with high reputation scores avoid 
fraudulent behavior and thus have lower costs of borrowing.  
Third, we investigate whether highly reputable firms are less likely to face bankruptcy. This 
is ultimately an empirical question and given that firm size and profitability increase while 
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idiosyncratic volatility and leverage decrease with firm reputation, we expect to find highly 
reputable firms to have lower likelihoods of failure. Therefore, it is essential for us to control for 
other firm characteristics known to influence credit risk when analyzing the effect of firm 
reputation on bond spreads as these characteristics are significantly correlated with reputation. 
We proxy for corporate reputation using ratings from Fortune magazine’s annual ranking of 
“most admired companies.” To produce its ranking, Fortune magazine conducts an annual survey 
in which industry experts are asked to rate companies along a number of dimensions, from 
financial soundness to social responsibility.
3
 The participants in the survey are senior executives, 
directors, and securities analysts from the same industry as the companies being measured.  They 
are familiar with the companies they assess and are thus likely to be informed in their judgments.  
The ratings are publicly available and convey information from knowledgeable industry insiders 
to investors about an organization’s underlying attributes – attributes that might otherwise be 
difficult for investors to observe.  The Fortune ratings are the most widely-used measure of 
company reputation in academic research in finance and management
4
 and are part of an 
emerging academic literature in accounting.
5
  The Fortune ratings are widely used because “they 
represent an independent measure of company reputation that covers a large number of 
companies, is publicly available, and appears to embody the construct “reputation” (Cao, Myers 
and Omer 2012; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Roberts and Dowling 2002). 
Using Fortune magazine’s “most admired companies” survey, we find that higher reputation 
scores are associated with lower monthly credit spreads on risky bonds. A half-point (0.5) 
improvement in the reputation score, or moving up one quintile in the reputation rankings, 
reduces credit spreads by roughly 14 basis points.  We obtain our results after taking into account 
the impact of firm-level variables known to affect credit risk.  Moreover, we find that the effect 
of the reputation score on credit spreads varies with the information environment: firm reputation 
has an even larger impact on credit spreads when other information about a firm is less-widely 
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 The dimensions are quality of management, quality of products or services, innovativeness, long-term 
investment value, financial soundness, responsibility to the community and the environment, wise use of corporate 
assets, and ability to attract, develop, and keep talented people.   
4
 See for example Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Fombrun, Gardberg and Sever 1999; Roberts and Dowling 2002; 
Barber, Heath and Odean 2003; Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy 2005; Anginer and Statman 2010. 
5
 See for example Cao, Myers and Omer (2012), Cao, Cassell, Myers and Omer (2012), and Cao, Myers, Myers 
and Omer (2014). 
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disseminated to outsiders as in the case when a company is covered by fewer analysts. We 
perform a series of tests to examine the robustness of our results. In our main regressions, we 
include firm fixed effects, Fama-Macbeth style regressions, and an instrumental variable 
approach to address possible endogeneity. In all, we find that the Fortune reputation score 
substantially improves our ability to explain the cross-section of corporate bond credit spreads.  
Additional testing shows that firms with high reputation face less stringent covenants and are 
less likely to be the target of SEC fraud investigations. We also find that the Fortune reputation 
score captures an aspect of credit risk not captured by traditional measures of distress risk. We 
find a highly significant inverse relation between our measure of reputation and the likelihood of 
firm default, even after controlling for credit rating, Merton’s distance-to-default measure, and a 
comprehensive list of accounting and market variables used by Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi 
(2008, hereafter CHS). While many firm-level characteristics, such as leverage, profitability and 
idiosyncratic volatility, have been found to predict firm failures, we identify an additional 
variable that is derived from industry experts’ knowledge and perception of the firm. This 
additional failure predictor reflects unique information about whether a firm’s true type is one 
that honors its commitments. Overall, the evidence suggests that reputation is an important 
determinant in the pricing of public corporate debt.  
Our paper is related to a strand of literature that examines the role of reputation as an 
informal enforcement mechanism when there are limits to contracting and adjudication.  Studies 
have found that reputation concerns facilitate commercial transactions by encouraging firms to 
perform even in the absence of formal contract enforcement (e.g., MacLeod 2007; Klein and 
Leffler 1981). Recent empirical work shows that reputation is a qualitatively important 
determinant of default rates under commercial contracts, deterring short-term opportunism 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2000; McMillan and Woodruff 1999).  Corporate reputation can also be 
considered a complement to corporate governance, as both are means to reduce agency 
problems. But while corporate governance mechanisms rely upon explicit contracts and external 
monitoring, reputation-based mechanisms rely upon self-discipline by the agent and repeated 
interactions between players. Cao, Myers and Omer (2012) find that reputation concerns 
motivate companies to maintain high financial reporting quality. Research has found that 
reputation concerns influence the behavior of auditing firms, investment banks, financial 
analysts, and directors into taking actions that provide long-term benefits instead of exclusively 
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short-term ones (e.g., Reynolds and Francis 2001; Larcker and Richardson 2004; Jackson 2005; 
Fich and Shivdasani 2007; Ljungqvist et al. 2007).  Despite the growing interest in company 
reputation and an increasing amount of reputation-related research, we know of no prior research 
that explicitly studies the effect of a company’s reputation on its borrowing costs. 
Our study also contributes to the literature on the determinants of the cost of debt.  Prior 
studies have attempted to explain variation in credit spreads on corporate bonds using firm 
characteristics, such as leverage and profitability, that are associated with financial distress (e.g., 
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin 2001; Duffee 1999; Amato and Remolona 2003; Elton et 
al. 2001).  These studies conclude that there is a large component of credit spread variation that 
remains unexplained.  Reputation enters these models only indirectly - to the extent captured by 
equity prices.  In this paper, we show that by explicitly incorporating firm reputation directly, we 
improve our understanding of credit risk.   
We further contribute to the literature on firm reputation by documenting an additional 
economic benefit associated with reputation.  While prior work has suggested that reputational 
capital is an important asset for many firms, allowing firms to charge premium prices for high 
quality products (Klein and Leffler 1981; Allen 1984; Milgrom and Roberts 1986) or lowering 
their cost of equity (noted above), our study shows that firm reputation can also lower the cost of 
debt. The findings should be of interest to researchers and company leaders interested in the 
benefits of building and protecting company reputation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Fortune reputation score 
and other data utilized in this study, and gives an overview of the methodology used. Section 3 
provides descriptive statistics. Section 4 establishes that the Fortune reputation score is not 
merely another proxy for default risk. Section 5 provides our main results. Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Data and Methodology 
We measure firm reputation using Fortune magazine’s annual ranking of “most admired 
companies.” Fortune magazine has published an annual survey of company reputations since 
1983.  Each year, Fortune asks senior executives, directors and securities analysts to rate the ten 
largest companies in their industry on eight attributes of reputation, using a scale from zero 
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(poor) to ten (excellent). The attributes are quality of management, quality of products or 
services, innovativeness, long-term investment value, financial soundness, responsibility to the 
community and the environment, wise use of corporate assets, and ability to attract, develop, and 
keep talented people.  The overall score of a company is the mean of the ratings on the eight 
attributes. This overall mean score is used to rank companies by reputation. Our approach 
follows that taken by Anginer and Statman (2010) and Statman, Fisher and Anginer (2008) in the 
equities literature. Those studies compare the stock performance of high-reputation companies to 
the stock performance of low-reputation companies. In this paper, we compare the cost of debt 
incurred by high reputation companies to the cost of debt incurred by low reputation companies. 
We obtain reputation scores published in years 1983-2007. The Fortune surveys are 
completed by respondents around September 30
th
 of each year, and the results are published 
during the first quarter of the subsequent year.  Since we are interested in the opinions of 
respondents at the time they are surveyed (as opposed to the time the information becomes 
public), we match a company’s Fortune reputation score with its firm-level data as of September 
30 (when the Fortune surveys are completed).  We also construct portfolios on that date.  The 
Fortune survey completed in September, 2006 and published in early 2007 includes 590 
companies.  In conducting the survey, Fortune asked roughly 10,000 senior executives, directors 
and securities analysts to rate the ten largest companies in their industries on eight attributes of 
reputation (from zero (poor) to ten (excellent)).  In 2007, FedEx Corporation ranked highest with 
an overall score of 8.70, followed by CHS with an overall score of 8.67 and Procter & Gamble 
with an overall score of 8.58.  Dana Corporation ranked at the very bottom with an overall score 
of 3.09. The different attributes are highly correlated, suggesting that there is common 
component driving all attributes.
6
 
Firm-level accounting information is obtained on a quarterly basis from COMPUSTAT and 
price information is obtained on a monthly basis from CRSP.  We exclude financial firms (SIC 
codes 6000 through 6999) from the sample. It is important for us to control for known 
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 We find that the first principal component of the eight attributes explains 85% of the variation in the 
reputation score.  Moreover, there is a 99.97% correlation between the first principal component and the mean 
reputation score, justifying use of the mean value.  We also repeated our main analyses using the first principal 
component of the attributes and obtained results that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results using 
the overall Fortune score.   
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determinants of credit spreads, especially those that relate to credit risk.  We use a number of 
distress measures that have been previously used in the literature (e.g., Anginer and Yildizhan 
2012; Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi 2008). The variables we use are the following: 
ROFITABILITY is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net income to 
total assets; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets; 
EXCESS RETURN is a geometrically declining average of monthly log excess stock returns 
relative to the S&P 500 index; CASH is the ratio of cash to the market value of total assets; 
IDIOVOL is the standard deviation of regression errors obtained from regressing daily excess 
returns on the Fama and French (1993) factors; MARKET-TO-BOOK is the market-to-book 
ratio; SIZE is market capitalization; MERTONDD is the Merton (1974) “distance-to-default” 
measure, which is the difference between the asset value of the firm and the face value of its 
debt, scaled by the standard deviation of the firm’s asset value; CHS-Z is the Campbell-Hilscher-
Szilagyi default score; RATING is the corporate credit rating obtained from Standard & Poor’s; 
and INST OWNERSHIP in residual institutional stock ownership.  The construction of the 
variables is described further in Appendix I.  To ensure that statistical results are not heavily 
influenced by outliers, we set all observations higher than the 99th percentile value of a given 
variable to the 99th percentile value. All values lower than the first percentile of each variable 
are winsorized in the same manner.       
Corporate bond data used in this study come from three separate databases: the Lehman 
Brothers Fixed Income Database (Lehman) for the period 1982 to 1997, the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners Database (NAIC) for the period 1994 to 2006, and the Trade 
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) system dataset from 2003 to 2007.  We also use the 
Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) for bond descriptions.  Our sample includes all U.S. 
corporate bonds listed in the above datasets that satisfy a set of selection criteria commonly used 
in the corporate bond literature (e.g., Duffee 1999; Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin 2001; 
Anginer and Yildizhan 2012; Anginer and Warburton 2014). We exclude all bonds that are 
matrix-priced (rather than market-priced) from the sample.  We remove all bonds with equity or 
derivative features (i.e., callable, puttable, and convertible bonds), bonds with warrants, and 
bonds with floating interest rates.  Finally, we eliminate all bonds that have less than one year to 
maturity.  
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A firm-year observation is included in our analysis if we have a reputation score, bond data 
from three bond databases (Lehman, NAIC, and TRACE), firm specific data from Compustat, 
institutional ownership data from Thomson Financial, stock return data from CRSP, and 
corporate governance data from RiskMetrics.  These limitations result in 15,434 firm years and 
315 unique firms with credit spread and firm-level data for which we also have a corresponding 
Fortune reputation score.   
 
3. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample of firms using the mean, median, 
standard deviation, and 25th and 75th percentiles. Our main variable reputation has mean and 
median scores of about 6.4 (out of 8) with a standard deviation of 0.90. The bonds in the sample 
have mean (median) credit spreads of about 140 (100) with a standard deviation of about 160 
basis points. Bonds also have mean credit ratings of about BBB+. In terms of firm 
characteristics, firms in the sample have median leverage ratio of 48%, cash ratio of 2.2%, 
market-to-book ratio of 2.1, governance index of about 10 (more shareholder than management 
rights), and 62% institutional ownership.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 Reputation is highly positively correlated with firm characteristics that are associated with 
higher likelihood of firm survival. Specifically, firms with higher profitability, lower leverage, 
lower idiosyncratic volatility, higher past returns and larger size also enjoy higher reputations.  
Firms with higher reputations hold less cash.  Higher reputation also implies lower likelihood of 
default as measured by traditional measures of distress risk - Merton’s distance to default, 
Standard & Poor’s corporate credit rating, and CHS z-score.   
To better understand how firm reputation is related to various default risk measures and other 
firm characteristics, we form portfolios based on reputation.  Table 2 reports summary statistics 
for portfolios of companies sorted on the Fortune reputation score.  According to Table 2, more 
reputable firms have lower credit spreads, both economically and statistically.  A one point 
increase in the reputation score would take a firm from the second-lowest reputation quintile to 
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the second-highest reputation quintile while reducing its credit spread from 133 basis points to 
106 basis points, a difference of 27 basis points.  More reputable firms also have higher market-
to-book ratios, in both an economic and statistical sense, suggesting that more reputable firms are 
valued similar to growth companies.      
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
There is a monotonic relation between the reputation score and Merton’s distance-to-default 
measure. As the reputation score increases so does the distance-to-default measure.  There is a 
similar monotonic relation between the reputation score and corporate ratings obtained from 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P).7  The numerical value of the S&P rating decreases as we move from 
the lowest reputation group (L) to the highest reputation group (H) indicating once again that 
high reputation firms have lower default risk.  A move from the lowest reputation group (L) to 
the highest reputation group (H) is equivalent to a firm increasing its rating from BBB/BBB- to 
A+/A.  We observe a similar monotonic pattern in portfolios that are sorted with respect to the 
CHS z-score.  The value of the CHS z-score increases as we move from the lowest reputation 
group (L) to the highest reputation group (H).  These monotonic relationships suggest that there 
may be some overlap between the reputation score and standard distress measures.  To better 
understand the extent of any potential overlap, we conduct a more detailed analysis in Section 4. 
 
4. Disentangling the Fortune Reputation Score from Default Risk  
Previous research has identified that low default risk firms have substantially lower credit 
spreads, i.e. lower costs of debt.  Could it be that high reputation firms have lower costs of debt 
simply because reputation is a direct proxy for default risk?  In this section, we investigate in 
detail the relation between reputation and default risk.   
In particular, we want to see if the inverse and monotonic relation between firm reputation 
and cost of debt persists once we explicitly control for the impact of distress risk.  To control for 
the effect of distress risk, we perform a double sort.  We sort firms into five groups each 
                                                 
7
 We follow convention and use a numerical rating scale to covert ratings.  The numerical values corresponding 
to rating notches are 1 for AAA, …, 20 for CC. 
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September from 1982 to 2006 based on the most recent measure of distress risk (using, 
alternatively, Merton’s distance to default (MERTONDD), S&P rating (RATING), and CHS z-
score (CHS-Z)).  Then, within each distress risk group, we sort firms according to their 
reputation scores (REPUTATION), creating a total of 25 portfolios. The credit spreads 
(SPREAD) for the five reputation portfolios are averaged over each distance to default portfolio 
to account for the impact of distress risk.  Hence, the reputation portfolios control for the impact 
of distress risk.  The same procedure is repeated using S&P rating (RATING) and using CHS z-
score (CHS-Z).  We also calculate the spread for a high-reputation minus low-reputation hedge 
portfolio.   
We report, in Panel A of Table 3, average values of Merton’s distance to default, S&P rating 
and CHS z-score for each of the five reputation portfolios.  There is a strong relation between 
reputation and the three distress risk measures. Merton’s distance to default increases 
monotonically from 4.36 for the lowest reputation group to 13.77 for the highest reputation 
group.  S&P rating decreases from 11.7 for the lowest reputation group to 4.18 for the highest 
reputation group.  Similarly, CHS z-score increases monotonically from 7.37 for the lowest 
reputation group to 8.83 for the highest reputation group.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Panel B shows the spreads for the individual 25 portfolios formed by double-sorting based on 
CHS z-score and the reputation score.  Panel B shows that the impact of reputation is greatest for 
firms in the highest distress risk portfolios.  A zero cost portfolio formed by going long high-
reputation firms and shorting low-reputation firms has an average spread difference of -284.54 
basis points, when these firms are in the highest distress risk group.  However, the zero cost 
portfolio has an average spread difference of only -57.70 basis points, when these firms are in the 
lowest distress risk group.  These results suggest that borrowing costs of high distress risk firms 
are a lot more sensitive to the impact of reputation. 
Panel C of Table 3 reports average spreads for the five reputation portfolios without 
controlling for distress risk, as well as average spreads after controlling for each of the three 
distress risk measures.  According to Panel C, a zero cost portfolio formed by going long high-
reputation firms and shorting low-reputation firms has an average spread difference of -109.5 
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basis points.  This premium decreases to only -93.6 basis points when we control for the effect of 
distress risk using the CHS z-score.  When we control for distress risk using Merton’s distance to 
default or S&P rating, the spread difference for the hedge portfolio is not reduced.  To the 
contrary, it is somewhat higher than in the uncontrolled case.  These results suggest that the cost 
of debt difference to high-reputation minus low-reputation bond portfolios cannot be explained 
away by the impact of distress risk, when traditional measures of distress risk are used.  The 
reputation score measures a distinct characteristic affecting the cost of debt that is not captured 
by the traditional distress risk measures. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
In this section, we first examine in greater detail the relation between the cost of debt and a 
firm’s reputation as measured by its Fortune score.  Regressing credit spreads on the Fortune 
reputation score and control variables, we find that a higher reputation score leads to a lower cost 
of debt (Section 5.1).  We then show that firms with higher reputation scores are associated with 
fewer debt covenants (Section 5.2) as well as fewer corporate fraud investigations (Section 5.3). 
Finally, we show empirically that the reputation measure is a good ex ante predictor of corporate 
default (Section 5.4).  We find that our measure of reputation contains information on default 
risk above and beyond that conveyed by the standard measures. 
   
5.1 Reputation and Credit Spreads 
To examine the relation between the cost of debt and firm reputation, we run regressions 
where we proxy for the cost of debt via firm-level corporate bond spreads described in Section 2.  
Table 4 reports OLS regressions of credit spreads on the reputation score, with standard credit-
risk controls and other determinants of corporate spreads.  It shows a robust inverse relation 
between a firm’s reputation and the credit spread on its bonds.  In each specification, the 
coefficient on the reputation variable is significant and takes a negative value.  Firms with better 
reputations enjoy lower credit spreads.   
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
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In the first column, credit spreads are regressed on the reputation variable along with control 
variables.  Controls include firm-level variables known to affect credit risk (CHS 2008), 
PROFITABILITY, LEVERAGE, CASH, RETURN, IDIOVOL, MARKET-TO-BOOK, and 
SIZE (log).  We also control for corporate credit rating (RATING) and the fraction of shares held 
by institutional investors (INST OWNERSHIP).  The specification employs firm-level fixed 
effects to mitigate potential endogeneity and unobservable firm heterogeneity that could cause a 
spurious relationship between credit spreads and company reputation.  The reputation measure 
(REPUTATION) is statistically significant.  The impact of reputation on the cost of debt, in 
addition to being statistically significant, is also economically meaningful.  A half-point (0.5) 
increase in the reputation score, or moving one quintile up in the reputation ranking, reduces the 
cost of debt by an economically significant 13.75 basis points.   
Corporate reputation might be considered a complement to corporate governance, as both are 
means to reduce agency problems.  Hence, in the second column, we add the governance 
measure (GOVERNANCE) as in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) to measure the extent of 
shareholder rights.  The impact of reputation on cost of debt retains its statistical and economic 
significance in the presence of the governance control.   
The reputation scores of companies in some industries might be higher on average than those 
in other industries.  Hence, in the third column, we employ industry fixed effects in place of firm 
fixed effects.  The coefficient on the reputation variable is highly significant statistically and 
economically.   
Past research ties CEO reputation to firm reputation. In order to control for the effect of CEO 
reputation on the firm’s cost of debt, in the fourth column, we employ CEO fixed effects in place 
of firm fixed effects, and once again find the coefficient on the reputation variable to be 
statistically significant with comparable economic impact.   
In column seven of Table 4, we find the same robust inverse relation between firm reputation 
and credit spreads when we use Fama-Macbeth regressions.  Overall, columns one, two, three, 
four and seven of Table 4 indicate that the Fortune reputation measure is negatively related to 
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credit spreads.
8
  We obtain our results after taking into account the impact of firm-level variables 
known to affect credit risk.  And the results are robust to alternative regression specifications, 
including fixed effects and Fama Macbeth regressions. 
These results contribute to the literature that tries to explain the variation in credit spreads.  
Prior studies have relied upon conventional financial health indicators, largely based upon 
accounting and market data, to explain variation in credit spreads (e.g., Collin-Dufresne, 
Goldstein and Martin 2001; Duffee 1999; Amato and Remolona 2003; Elton et al. 2001).  Those 
studies find that a large component of credit spread variation remains unexplained.  Reputation 
enters these models only indirectly, to the extent it is being captured by equity prices.  By 
explicitly incorporating reputation, we find that we improve our ability to explain cross-sectional 
variation in credit spreads.   
Since theoretical work (e.g., Diamond 1989, 1991; Milgrom and Roberts 1982) views 
reputation as emerging out of asymmetric information, it is also important to examine how the 
information environment affects the relation between reputation and the cost of debt.  Reputation 
can substitute for tangible information about a borrower.  When tangible information about a 
firm is less-readily available to investors, reputation should play a greater role in determining the 
cost of debt.  Thus, the ability of market participants to observe and gather tangible information 
about the firm should affect the value they attach to a company’s reputation.   
In columns five and six of  Table 4, we examine whether the effect of reputation on the cost 
of debt varies with information availability.  In particular, we expect reputation to have a larger 
impact when firms are opaque and there is greater information asymmetry.  Prior research 
suggests that financial analysts play a key role in mitigating information asymmetry between 
firms and market participants (e.g., Brennan and Hughes 1991; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Hong, 
Lim and Stein 2000; Mansi, Maxwell and Miller 2004; Mansi, Maxwell and Miller 2011; 
Agarwal and O’Hara 2006).  Hence, reputation should be more important for firms with lower 
analyst coverage.  We include the number of analysts following a firm, ANALYST, in column 
                                                 
8
 To further examine the robustness of the reputation-spread relationship, we also repeat our analyses using the 
first principal component of the reputation attributes and find that the results are qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar.   
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(5) of Table 4.  To construct that variable, we take the average number of analysts making annual 
estimates for a firm in a given year.   
The coefficient on ANALYST is significant and negative.  Firms with lower analyst 
coverage have greater credit spreads, consistent with the prior literature.  More importantly, the 
reputation variable remains significant despite the inclusion of the ANALYST variable.  The 
impact of reputation is not subsumed by the firm’s analyst coverage.   
If firm reputation helps to determine a company’s cost of debt, its effect should be most 
pronounced when this type of information is most valuable to investors – when other information 
about the firm is less-readily available from analysts.  To conduct this test, we interact the 
analyst coverage measure with the reputation variable (REPUTATION * ANALYST).  The 
coefficient on this interaction term is positive and significant. Firms with lower analyst coverage, 
but higher reputation scores, have lower credit spreads. The result indicates that firm reputation 
has an even larger effect on credit spreads when a company is covered by fewer analysts.   
In addition to analyst coverage, we also use firm size to measure the availability of 
information.
9
  Fama (1985) argues that the information supplied by a firm increases with its size.  
Similarly, Easley and O’Hara (2004) show that size acts as a measure of the information 
structure of the firm.  Hence, reputation should play a greater role for smaller companies.  
Results are in column (6).  The significant negative coefficient on log SIZE indicates that small 
firms have higher credit spreads.  More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term, 
REPUTATION * log SIZE, is significant and positive.  The effect of reputation on credit spreads 
is greater for smaller firms. 
Whether we measure the availability of information using analyst coverage or firm size, we 
reach a similar conclusion: as less information is available to outsiders, a firm’s reputation 
carries more weight in the pricing of its debt.  The value that market participants attach to a 
firm’s reputation varies with their ability to observe and gather other information about the firm.  
Stating it in broader terms, the effect of firm reputation on the cost of debt varies with the 
information environment of the firm.  In that sense, our study extends recent papers that examine 
                                                 
9
 We also used PIN (Probability of Informed Trading), an alternative measure of information asymmetry, and 
got qualitatively similar results.  However, we do not include in this paper the results with the PIN measure, as there 
can be alternative interpretations of what PIN measures in this context. 
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how firms can lower borrowing costs by engaging reputable third-party certifiers, such as 
auditors, underwriters, banks and securities exchanges. Studies suggest that third-party 
certification can lower borrowing costs by overcoming information problems between insiders 
and outsiders (Fang 2005; Pittman and Fortin 2004; Mansi, Maxwell and Miller 2004; Andres, 
Betzer and Limbach 2012; Livingston and Miller 2000).  We show that, in addition to exploiting 
the reputations of third-party certifiers, firms can also exploit their own good reputations to 
lower their cost of debt.
 10
 
In sum, we find a robust and significant inverse relation between the Fortune reputation score 
and the cost of debt.  A half-point (0.5) improvement in the reputation score, or moving up a 
quintile in reputation rankings, reduces the cost of debt by approximately 6.2 to 21 basis points, 
even after taking into account the effect of other firm-level variables that are known to affect 
credit risk.  This impact is more significant for smaller firms and when other information about 
the firm is disseminated less widely. 
   
5.1.1 Reputation and Credit Spreads: Instrumental Variable Analysis 
Diamond (1991) suggests that firm age can be used as a proxy for firm reputation.  For 
robustness, we use age of the firm from its initial public offering as an instrumental variable for 
Fortune scores to alleviate potential endogeneity concerns.  Prior research suggests that firm age 
is related to reputation and is likely to affect corporate bond spreads through the reputation 
channel.   
In columns (8) and (9) of Table 4 we report the results of the first stage and second stage 
instrumental variable analyses where Reputation is instrumented via firm age. Results reported in 
column (8) show that firm age is significantly related to Fortune scores.  Results reported in 
                                                 
10
 The existing literature on the cost of debt has attempted to proxy for firm reputation by measuring narrower 
attributes of a company.  To ensure that our reputation measure contains unique information not contained in these 
other measures, we included them as independent variables in our regressions.  Controls for firm size, analyst 
coverage and credit rating are included in the results shown in Table 4.  We also added controls for disclosure 
quality, auditor quality, underwriter quality, CEO tenure, and length of time the bonds have been outstanding.  Since 
these additional controls are generally available for smaller subsamples of firms, we did not include them in the 
results shown in this paper but analyzed them separately as robustness tests.  We find that our reputation measure is 
not subsumed by these other measures and is instead robust to their inclusion.  The results suggest that the Fortune 
score is capturing unique information about company reputation.    
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column (9) verify earlier findings by showing a significant negative relationship between 
corporate bond spreads and firm reputation using firm age as an instrument. 
 
5.2 Reputation and Covenants 
 The agency theory of covenants predicts that small, highly levered, volatile firms with 
significant information asymmetries would be more likely to include covenants in their debt 
agreements (Bradley and Roberts 2004). As it was shown earlier, highly reputable firms tend to 
be larger, with smaller leverage, lower volatility as well as being more transparent in their 
financial reporting, which taken together suggest that more reputable firms should face fewer 
covenant restrictions. In an attempt to measure the marginal effect of firm reputation on covenant 
intensity we control for variables such as firm size, leverage, volatility and analyst coverage that 
are known to affect covenant intensity and at the same time are highly correlated with firm 
reputation.  
We obtain covenant information from FISD.  For each bond issue, FISD reports more than 
50 variables on bondholder protective, issuer restrictive, and subsidiary restrictive covenants. 
Because there can be multiple covenants that restrict the same activity, we group the covenant 
variables into 22 dummies, which indicate whether a specific type of activity is restricted.  
Our construction of the 22 covenant dummies is similar to that of Mansi, Qi, and Wald 
(2013) and Billett, King, and Mauer (2007). Appendix II provides details on the covenant 
variables. Finally, we create an overall covenant intensity index by summing the 22 covenant 
indicators for each bond (TOTAL COVENANTS).  We also create a dichotomous variable 
taking the value of 1 if the bond contains more than the median number of covenants (HIGH 
COVENANTS). 
Table 5 reports the effect of firm reputation (REPUTATION) on the number of covenants.  
Columns (1) and (2) report results from logit regressions of the covenant indicator variable 
HIGH COVENANTS on REPUTATION and other predictor variables.  REPUTATION has a 
significant negative effect on HIGH COVENANTS.  Firms with higher reputations are less 
likely to issue bonds with extensive covenants.  Columns (3) through (6) report results from 
Poisson regressions of the total number of a bond’s covenants (TOTAL COVENANTS) on 
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REPUTATION and other predictor variables.  Again, firms with higher reputations are less 
likely to issue bonds with extensive covenants. These results suggest that the participants in the 
bond market recognize the firm level differences in reputations and incorporate this information 
in the way they design bond contracts. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
5.3 Reputation and Fraud 
As discussed earlier, firms with high reputations are more likely to avoid fraudulent behavior 
in an attempt to preserve their lower costs of borrowing.  Diamond (1991) theorizes that firms 
borrow and repay consistently in order to establish a good credit history and build up reputation 
over time. We conjecture that the reputation is a valuable asset that firms attempt to preserve by 
avoiding actions that may reduce its value.  In particular, Karpoff and Lott (1993) and Karpoff, 
Lee, and Martin (2008) show that reputational costs of corporate fraud are large and constitute 
most of the costs incurred by firms accused or convicted of fraud.  We test whether firms with 
high reputation scores avoid fraudulent behavior. In particular, we examine the empirical relation 
between a firms’ Fortune scores and SEC enforcement actions due to fraud.  
We identify firms that have been subject to enforcement actions by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) for allegedly violating a securities fraud statue under either the 
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Data on fraud come from the 
SEC Enforcement Action Database of Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008) updated to September 
2009.  The charges filed by the SEC against the firm identify the period over which the firm 
allegedly engaged in financial misconduct.  We classify as fraud years the violation period in 
which the firm engaged in financial misconduct.  We create an indicator variable (FRAUD 
FLAG) taking the value of 1 if an SEC enforcement action includes a violation of a securities 
fraud statue under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Table 6 reports results from logit regressions of FRAUD FLAG on REPUTATION and other 
control variables.  The controls that we use are similar to those used in the literature that has 
examined fraud prediction.  The prior literature suggests that corporate governance may also be 
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an important determinant of fraudulent behavior (see for instance, Agrawal and Chadha 2005).  
We control for corporate governance in separate regressions as its inclusion results in a 
significant reduction in the number of observations in the sample.  We also report results 
separately for the full sample of firms with Fortune scores as well as the sample of firms with 
Fortune scores that have corporate bonds outstanding.   
Columns (1) and (2) report results from the full sample, and columns (3) and (4) report 
results for the subset of firms with bonds outstanding.  For all the specifications reported in 
Table 6, the coefficient on REPUTATION is significant and negative suggesting that firms with 
better reputations are less likely to face SEC enforcement due to fraud.  The effect of the control 
variables on the probability of fraud are similar to those reported in the prior studies.  The results 
become slightly weaker when we consider only firms with bonds outstanding, which results in a 
reduction in the number of observations included in the regression. Overall, the empirical results 
are consistent with the notion that firms with high reputations avoid fraudulent behavior to 
preserve their lower costs of borrowing.  These results are also consistent with the theoretical 
literature that emphasizes that reputation built over time is an important intangible asset that 
affects credit relationships. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
5.4 Reputation and Failure Prediction 
In Section 5.1 we show that higher reputation leads to lower cost of debt, in section 5.2 
we document that firms with better reputations face less covenant restrictions and in section 5.3 
we show that highly reputable firms are less likely to face S.E.C enforcement actions due to 
fraud. In this section, we show that highly reputable firms are less likely to face bankruptcy 
lending further support to our findings in the previous sections.   
To measure the probability o f  a  c o r p o r a t e  f a i l u r e , we estimate a dynamic 
panel model using a logit specification, following Anginer and Yildizhan (2012), Shumway 
(2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and CHS (2008).  We use information available at the end of 
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the calendar year to predict failures twelve months ahead. Specifically, the marginal probability 
of failure (PF) for company i over the next year t is assumed to follow a logistic distribution: 
 
𝑃𝐹𝑡
𝑖 =
1
1 +exp(−𝛼 − 𝛽𝑋𝑡
𝑖)
 (1) 
where X is a vector of explanatory variables available at the time of prediction, and includes a 
comprehensive list of explanatory variables that have been used by previous papers to predict 
corporate failures.  Our failure measure is defined as rating downgrade to CCC+ or below by 
Standard and Poor’s, a severely negative assessment of a company’s capability of meeting its 
obligations.  We employ accounting variables used in CHS (2008) as well as Merton’s distance-
to-default measure.  All variables included in the hazard regressions that follow are described in 
detail in Appendix I.   
Results are reported in Table 7.  In the first two columns, we include only covariates used by 
CHS (2008).  The first column includes all observations, and the second column includes only 
observations with an associated reputation score.  The coefficient estimates, and the McFadden’s 
pseudo R
2
 values
11
, are very similar, indicating that the sub-sample of firms with a reputation 
score does not differ significantly from the overall sample.  The coefficients on 
PROFITABILITY and EXCESS RETURN are significant and negative, indicating that greater 
profitability and greater stock performance lower default probability, in line with the literature’s 
findings.  The coefficients on LEVERAGE and IDIOVOL are significant and positive, indicating 
that greater leverage and greater stock volatility increase default probability, again in line with 
established results. The coefficients on CASH and MARKET-TO-BOOK are statistically 
insignificant, which is not surprising given that these are large firms. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
                                                 
11
 McFadden’s pseudo R2 is calculated as 1 − L1/L0, where L1 is the log likelihood of the estimated model and 
L0 is the log likelihood of a null model that includes only a constant term. 
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In the third column, we add the reputation score, REPUTATION, as an additional covariate 
to the credit risk variables.  A higher reputation score significantly lowers failure probability, 
even with the credit risk control variables included. 
We confirm the results by running additional regressions in columns (4) and (5).  Column (4) 
uses Merton’s distance to default alone.  The reputation score is added as a covariate to Merton’s 
distance to default in column (5).  The coefficient on REPUTATION remains highly significant, 
with the anticipated negative sign.  The reputation score contributes failure-related information 
that is not already captured by Merton’s distance to default. 
The conclusion is that the reputation of a firm among industry experts improves failure 
prediction, even after we control for the more traditional determinants of credit risk.  The success 
of the reputation variable in failure prediction suggests that reputation captures unique 
information not contained in the standard credit risk measures.  The results also suggest that 
reduction in default risk (and its associated costs) is the channel through which reputation affects 
credit spreads.  
  
6. Conclusion 
We show that firm reputation plays an important role in determining the cost of debt.  We 
employ a direct and comprehensive measure of company reputation using the annual ranking of 
“most admired companies” published by Fortune magazine, which surveys industry experts 
about firm reputations along a host of dimensions.  We find a robust inverse relation between a 
firm’s reputation as measured by its score in the Fortune survey and the firm-level value-
weighted credit spread on its bonds.  A half-point (0.5) improvement in the reputation score, or 
moving up one quintile in the reputation ranking, leads to a reduction of 14 basis points in the 
cost of debt, after controlling variables that are known to impact bond spreads as well as other 
traditional reputation proxies used in prior work.  We find that the impact of reputation on the 
cost of debt is more pronounced when other information about the firm is less-widely 
disseminated.  In addition, we find that reputation’s impact is more pronounced in smaller firms 
and firms with higher distress risk. 
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We show how the Fortune reputation score helps to explain variation in credit spreads: it 
captures unique information about whether a firm will honor its commitments.  The Fortune 
reputation variable is a good ex ante predictor of corporate distress, improving upon standard 
measures used in the literature.  It contains information about default risk above and beyond that 
conveyed by accounting and market variables, corporate ratings and structural parameters. We 
also find that firms with high reputation face less stringent covenants and are less likely to be the 
target of SEC fraud investigations.  In all, we find that by explicitly accounting for firm 
reputation, we improve our understanding of credit risk.  We also find that favorable firm 
reputation conveys tangible financial benefits to a company through a reduction in its cost of 
debt capital.    
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
  
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
REPUTATION 6.431 6.440 0.903 5.860 7.050 
SPREAD 140.1 100.3 160.2 70.4 150.2 
PROFITABILITY 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.010 
LEVERAGE 0.492 0.475 0.232 0.309 0.648 
EXCESS RETURN -0.003 0.000 0.027 -0.018 0.014 
CASH 0.042 0.022 0.057 0.009 0.050 
IDIOVOL 0.016 0.014 0.007 0.012 0.018 
MARKET-TO-BOOK 2.354 2.096 1.284 1.396 3.061 
SIZE 8,258 1,956 23,880 586 6,059 
MERTONDD 8.999 8.059 4.845 5.539 11.501 
CHS-Z 7.914 7.983 0.547 7.594 8.297 
RATING 7.617 7.000 2.728 6.000 9.000 
MOMENTUM 0.165 0.149 0.372 -0.044 0.323 
GOVERNANCE 9.851 10.000 2.625 8.000 12.000 
INST OWNERSHIP 0.616 0.624 0.151 0.526 0.717 
 
Note: This table reports summary statistics for firm characteristics and distress measures for companies in the 
sample.  REPUTATION is the firm’s reputation score, SPREAD is the firm-level credit spread, PROFITABILITY 
is net income to total assets, LEVERAGE is the total liabilities to total assets, EXCESS RETURN is the average 
monthly return in excess of the S&P 500 index, CASH is cash to total assets, IDIOVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, 
MARKET-TO-BOOK is the market-to-book ratio, SIZE is market capitalization (measured in millions), 
MERTONDD is Merton’s distance to default, CHS-Z is CHS z-score, RATING is the Standard & Poor’s corporate 
rating converted into numeric value (AAA=1, …, CC=20), MOMENTUM is cumulative return over the prior twelve 
months, GOVERNANCE is a governance index, INST OWNERSHIP is the fraction of shares outstanding held by 
institutional investors.  The variables are defined in Appendix I. P25, P50 and P75 represent 25
th
, 50
th
 and 75
th
 
percentiles, respectively.  
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Table 2 
Fortune Companies 
 
  L 2 3 4 H H-L 
REPUTATION 5.176 5.972 6.430 6.908 7.663 2.487
***
 
SPREAD 207.5 133.0 118.8 105.5 82.1 -125.4
***
 
PROFITABILITY 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.005
***
 
LEVERAGE 0.612 0.547 0.492 0.453 0.364 -0.248
***
 
EXCESS RETURN -0.007 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.009
***
 
CASH 0.053 0.039 0.044 0.039 0.038 -0.014
***
 
IDIOVOL 0.020 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.014 -0.006
***
 
MARKET-TO-BOOK 1.853 2.072 2.191 2.437 3.189 1.335
***
 
SIZE 4,441 6,848 8,547 13,603 34,712 30,271
***
 
MERTONDD 6.782 8.213 8.821 9.494 11.512 4.730
***
 
CHS-Z 7.636 7.832 7.941 7.996 8.147 0.511
***
 
RATING 9.496 8.380 7.730 7.159 5.642 -3.853
***
 
MOMENTUM 0.196 0.162 0.144 0.186 0.140       -0.056
*
 
GOVERNANCE 9.772 10.152 10.004 10.058 9.257        -0.515
**
 
INST OWNERSHIP 0.558 0.601 0.612 0.609 0.597           0.039
***
 
 
Note: This table reports summary statistics for firm characteristics and distress measures for portfolios of companies 
sorted by the level of the REPUTATION score from low (L) to high (H).  H-L reports the difference between the 
highest reputation portfolio and the lowest.  REPUTATION is the firm’s reputation score, SPREAD is the firm-level 
credit spread in basis points, PROFITABILITY is net income to total assets, LEVERAGE is the total liabilities to 
total assets, EXCESS RETURN is the average monthly return in excess of the S&P 500 index, CASH is cash to total 
assets, IDIOVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, MARKET-TO-BOOK is the market-to-book ratio, SIZE is market 
capitalization (measured in millions), MERTONDD is Merton’s distance to default, CHS-Z is CHS z-score, 
RATING is the Standard & Poor’s corporate rating converted into numeric value (AAA=1, …, CC=20), 
MOMENTUM is cumulative return over the prior twelve months, GOVERNANCE is a governance index, INST 
OWNERSHIP is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional investors.  The variables are defined in 
Appendix I.  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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Table 3 
Cost of Capital in Reputation-Sorted Portfolios, Controlling for Default Risk Measures 
 
Panel A: Mean Values of Default Risk Measures in Reputation-Sorted Portfolios 
 
   REPUTATION    
     L    2    3    4    H  H-L 
MERTONDD 4.36
***
 6.22
***
 7.79
***
 9.53
***
 13.77
***
  9.41
***
 
RATING 11.7
***
 8.96
***
 7.21
***
 5.78
***
 4.18
***
 -7.49
***
 
CHS-Z 7.37
***
 7.87
***
 8.15
***
 8.41
***
 8.83
***
  1.48
***
 
 
 
Panel B: Cost of Capital in Double-Sorted Portfolios Based on CHS Z-Score and Reputation 
 
 REPUTATION 
CHS-Z     L     2     3     4     H    H-L 
L 383.57
***
 225.21
***
 158.88
***
 127.46
***
 99.02
***
 -284.54
***
 
Highest Default Risk (5.25) (3.90) (10.08) (7.76) (10.02) (4.16) 
2 240.55
***
 152.04
***
 109.92
***
 114.76
***
 91.71
***
 -148.84
***
 
  (6.48) (9.84) (11.86) (8.76) (9.03) (4.66) 
3 214.48
***
 130.84
***
 120.49
***
 114.37
***
 76.73
***
 -137.76
***
 
  (4.38) (8.48) (11.370 (8.70) (11.76) (3.03) 
4 147.93
***
 128.85
***
 105.13
***
 102.15
***
 76.32
***
 -71.61
***
 
  (8.25) (9.41) (11.48) (13.97) (13.53) (4.09) 
H 136.50
***
 111.78
***
 107.44
***
 91.55
***
 78.81
***
 -57.70
***
 
Lowest Default Risk (8.14) (8.32) (7.92) (8.72) (11.80) (3.80) 
 
 
Panel C: Average Spreads for Reputation-Sorted Portfolios (in basis points) Before and After Controlling for Default 
Risk 
 
 REPUTATION 
  L 2 3 4 H H-L 
Before controls 
  203.6
***
      142.5
***
      118.1
***
      113.2
***
      94.1
***
    -109.5
***
 
 (9.31)    (11.21)    (18.66)       (13.67)    (11.66)    (5.05) 
        
Controlling for MERTONDD 
  226.6
***
      148.9
***
      129.8
***
      112.6
***
      96.6
***
    -129.9
***
 
 (7.23)    (10.26)    (9.27)      (12.74)    (12.70)    (4.78) 
        
Controlling for RATING 
  212.1
***
      163.4
***
      136.6
***
      110.4
***
      88.8
***
    -123.3
***
 
 (8.65)    (7.48)    (5.44)      (7.77)    (13.87)    (5.61) 
        
Controlling for CHS-Z  
  198.8
***
      141.8
***
      131.4
***
      112.1
***
      105.2
***
     -93.6
***
 
 (6.71)    (10.02)    (7.98)       (13.03)    (10.07)    (4.25) 
 
Note: This table reports the mean annual spreads (in basis points) for reputation portfolios after controlling for different 
measures of default risk, i.e. Merton’s distance to default (MERTONDD), S&P ratings (RATING) and CHS z- score 
(CHS-Z). Default risk portfolios are formed by sorting firms into five groups each September from 1982 to 2006 
according to the most recent measure of distress risk (using, alternatively, MERTONDD, RATING, and CHS-Z).  Then 
within each default risk group we sort firms into five groups based on the Fortune reputation score (REPUTATION), 
creating a total of 25 portfolios. The spread (SPREAD) in basis points for the five reputation portfolios are averaged 
over each distance to default portfolio to account for the impact of distress risk. Hence, the reputation portfolios control 
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for distress risk. The same procedure is repeated for S&P rating (RATING) and CHS z-score (CHS-Z). Finally we 
calculate the spread for a high-reputation minus low-reputation hedge portfolio. Panel A reports the average values of 
different distress risk measures in the five reputation portfolios as well as the mean difference for these measures for the 
high-reputation minus low-reputation hedge portfolio.  Panel B reports the average spread in basis points for the 25 
portfolios formed by double-sorting based on CHS-Z and REPUTATION.  Panel C reports the mean annual spread in 
basis points for reputation portfolios before and after controlling for the different measures of default risk 
(MERTONDD, RATING, CHS-Z).  The variables are defined in Appendix I.  Absolute values of t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
, respectively 
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Table 4 
Reputation Regressions 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Fama 
 
IV 
 
IV 
 
VARIABLES SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD 
MacBeth 
SPREAD 
STEP-1 
 
STEP-2 
SPREAD 
                 
REPUTATION -27.50
**
 -25.90
*
 -27.50
***
 -33.6
*
 -42.0
***
 -185.5
***
 -12.8
***
  -75.3
***
 
  (2.08) (1.80) (3.20) (1.83) (2.66) (4.71) (3.50)  (2.67) 
PROFITABILITY -1518.6
***
 -1551.0
***
 -1239.7
**
 -2091.3
**
 -1748.4
***
 -1545.6
***
 -282.30 7.319
**
 -277.2 
  (2.68) (2.66) (2.27) (2.39) (3.34) (2.69) (0.50) (2.16) (0.37) 
LEVERAGE 85.30 61.20 96.70
***
 4.00 95.60
*
 48.50 99.70
**
 -0.354
***
 5.00 
  (1.63) (1.06) (3.19) (0.06) (1.69) (0.89) (2.59) (3.28) (0.18) 
CASH 85.50 94.90 -71.90 58.40 92.30 121.10 -1.20 -0.688
**
 -168.40
***
 
  (1.06) (0.97) (1.07) (0.57) (0.96) (1.31) (0.02) (2.16) (2.74) 
RETURN -201.80
*
 -157.30 -212.60
**
 25.7 -170.4 -187.90
*
 -471.8
**
 0.052 -185.30 
  (1.80) (1.46) (1.98) (0.24) (1.50) (1.77) (2.23) (0.06) (1.03) 
IDIOVOL 7516.30
***
 8002.30
***
 8058.80
***
 5522.40
***
 7825.00
***
 7718.90
***
 6426.00
**
 -15.726
***
 5885.90
***
 
  (5.08) (5.44) (6.63) (3.36) (5.88) (5.59) (2.63) (3.38) (4.12) 
MARKET-TO-BOOK -60.20
*
 -54.40
*
 -51.30
***
 -84.60
**
 6.30 4.20 12.30
***
 0.057
***
 11.50
*
 
  (1.89) (1.65) (2.62) (2.40) (0.73) (0.51) (3.16) (2.85) (1.95) 
Log SIZE -59.70
***
 -67.40
***
 -10.50
**
 -81.10
***
 -60.90
***
 -190.00
***
 -13.70
**
 0.262
***
 27.10
*
 
  (3.13) (3.12) (2.33) (2.90) (2.73) (5.09) (2.26) (13.79) (1.92) 
RATING 5.10
*
 2.60 7.00
***
 -1.50 2.60 2.60 11.00
***
 -0.049
***
 0.60 
  (1.82) (0.67) (3.33) (0.30) (0.70) (0.68) (3.61) (5.44) (0.17) 
INST OWNERSHIP -0.80 -0.70 -0.60 -0.50 -0.50 -1.10 -37.80
**
 -0.008
*
 -2.10
**
 
  (1.14) (1.17) (1.00) (0.83) (0.83) (1.57) (2.19) (1.69) (2.33) 
GOVERNANCE 
 
5.60 -0.00 6.20
*
 4.70 4.70 1.42  -153.50
***
 
  
 
(1.40) (0.00) (1.77) (1.21) (1.15) (0.96)  (2.64) 
ANALYST  
   
 -11.90
***
 
  
  
  
   
 (2.90) 
  
  
REPUTATION×ANALYST 
Following    
 2.00
***
 
  
  
  
   
 (3.33) 
  
  
REPUTATION×Log SIZE 
   
 
 
0.191
***
 
 
  
  
   
 
 
(4.90) 
 
  
 FIRM AGE 
   
 
   
0.005
***
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        (5.10)  
          
Firm FE Y Y N N Y Y N N N 
Industry FE N N Y N N N N N N 
CEO FE N N N Y N N N N N 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y 
Observations 2,798 2,029 2,029 1,796 2,026 2,029 2,029 2,187 2,187 
R-squared 0.775 0.788 0.636 0.85 0.792 0.796 0.583 0.385 0.388 
 
Note: Table 4 reports OLS and Fama-Macbeth regressions of SPREAD on firm characteristics and distress measures.  SPREAD is the firm-level credit spread, 
REPUTATION is the firm’s reputation score, PROFITABILITY is net income to total assets, LEVERAGE is the total liabilities to total assets, CASH is cash to 
total assets, RETURN is the cumulative return over the past year, IDIOVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, MARKET-TO-BOOK is the market-to-book ratio, Log 
SIZE is the logarithm of market capitalization (measured in millions), RATING is the Standard & Poor’s corporate rating converted into numeric value (AAA=1, 
…, CC=20), INST OWNERSHIP is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional investors, GOVERNANCE is a governance index, ANALYSTS is the 
number of analysts (divided by 100) that follow the firm.  The variables are defined in Appendix I.  Columns 1 through 6 report OLS coefficient estimates using 
year fixed effects.  In addition, firm fixed effects are used in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, industry fixed effects are used in column 3, and CEO fixed effects are used in 
column 4.  Column 7 reports results using Fama-Macbeth regressions. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Covenant Use 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Logit Logit Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson 
VARIABLES 
High  
Covenants 
High  
Covenants 
Total  
Covenants 
Total  
Covenants 
Total  
Covenants 
Total  
Covenants 
       REPUTATION -0.107
***
 -0.0915
**
 -0.046
**
 -0.046
**
 -0.011
*
 -0.006
*
 
 
(0.00) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) 
PROFITABILITY 18.894 10.933 2.084 1.982 -0.203 -0.328 
 
(0.18) (0.43) (0.31) (0.32) (0.88) (0.82) 
LEVERAGE  0.452 0.498 -0.149 -0.162 -0.258
***
 -0.246
**
 
 
(0.59) (0.55) (0.13) (0.11) (0.00) (0.01) 
CASH -8.413
***
 -9.659
***
 -0.735
**
 -0.872
***
 -0.006 -0.065 
 
(2.483) (2.716) (0.306) (0.307) (0.249) (0.256) 
RETURN 7.236
**
 8.100
**
 0.066 0.060 0.202 0.209 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.88) (0.89) (0.71) (0.73) 
IDIOVOL 38.908
*
 32.544 4.901 5.470 1.574 2.398 
 
(0.06) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.59) (0.50) 
MARKET-TO-BOOK 0.255
*
 0.279
**
 0.042
**
 0.041
**
 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.08) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.70) (0.70) 
Log SIZE -0.578
***
 -0.592
***
 0.053
***
 0.057
***
 -0.080
***
 -0.081
***
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
RATING 0.399
***
 0.425
***
 -0.106
***
 -0.104
***
 -0.005 -0.006 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.62) (0.59) 
INST OWNERSHIP -0.472 -0.566 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.16) (0.11) (0.69) (0.55) (0.62) (0.51) 
GOVERNANCE 
 
-0.125
**
 
 
-0.016
**
 
 
-0.005 
  
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.32) 
Lag COVENANTS 
    
1.894
***
 1.929
***
 
     
(0.00) (0.00) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,320 1,259 1,331 1,259 580 561 
 
Note: Table 5 reports the effect of firm reputation (REPUTATION) on the number of covenants in corporate bonds.  Columns (1) and (2) report results from logit 
regressions of a covenant indicator variable (HIGH COVENANTS) on predictor variables.  HIGH COVENANT is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 
if a bond contains more than the median number of covenants.  Columns (3) through (6) report results from Poisson regressions of the total number of a bond’s 
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covenants (TOTAL COVENANTS) on predictor variables.  REPUTATION is the firm’s reputation score, PROFITABILITY is net income to total assets, 
LEVERAGE is the total liabilities to total assets, CASH is cash to total assets, RETURN is the cumulative return over the past year, IDIOVOL is idiosyncratic 
volatility, MARKET-TO-BOOK is the market-to-book ratio, Log SIZE is the logarithm of market capitalization (measured in millions), RATING is the Standard 
& Poor’s corporate rating converted into numeric value (AAA=1, …, CC=20), INST OWNERSHIP is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional 
investors, GOVERNANCE is a governance index, Lag COVENANTS is TOTAL COVENANTS lagged by one year.  The variables are defined in Appendix I.  
All columns include year fixed effects. P-values are reported below coefficient estimates. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by 
*
, 
**
, 
and 
***
, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Fraud Prediction 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Logit Logit Logit Logit 
 
 
   
 Fraud Flag Fraud Flag Fraud Flag Fraud Flag 
Sample Full Sample Full Sample Bond Sample Bond Sample 
  
    REPUTATION -0.233
***
 -0.186
**
 -0.339
*
 -0.407
**
 
  (0.00) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Log SIZE 0.529
***
 0.476
***
 0.683
***
 0.876
***
 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MARKET-TO-BOOK 0.266
***
 0.235
***
 0.144 0.247 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.34) (0.12) 
LEVERAGE 1.479
***
 1.749
***
 0.495 1.342 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.58) (0.14) 
IDIOVOL 2.107
***
 2.154
***
 1.636
*
 1.899
*
 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.05) 
PROFITABILITY -2.189 8.904 -8.091 -11.05 
  (0.79) (0.45) (0.67) (0.55) 
GOVERNANCE 
 
-0.036 
 
0.311
***
 
  
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.00) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1051 0.0844 0.0894 0.1396 
Observations 8,192 5,572 1,991 1,719 
Fraud occurrences 188 161 42 39 
 
Note: This table reports results from logit regressions of a fraud indicator variable (FRAUD FLAG) on predictor 
variables.  FRAUD FLAG is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if a Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) enforcement action includes a violation of a securities fraud statue under either the Securities Act of 1933 or 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  REPUTATION is the firm’s reputation score, Log SIZE is the logarithm of 
market capitalization (measured in millions), MARKET-TO-BOOK is the market-to-book ratio, LEVERAGE is the 
total liabilities to total assets, IDIOVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, PROFITABILITY is net income to total assets, 
GOVERNANCE is a governance index.   The variables are defined in Appendix I.  P-values are reported below 
coefficient estimates.  McFadden pseudo R
2
 values are reported for each regression.  Statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Failure Prediction 
 
 
Note: This table reports results from logit regressions of a failure indicator variable (FAILURE) on predictor variables.  
FAILURE is dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if a firm is predicted to be downgraded to CCC+ or below by 
Standard & Poor’s in twelve months.  PROFITABILITY is net income to total assets, LEVERAGE is the total 
liabilities to total assets, EXCESS RETURN is the average monthly return in excess of the S&P 500 index, IDIOVOL 
is idiosyncratic volatility, C ASH is cash to total assets, MARKET-TO-BOOK is the market-to-book ratio, 
MERTONDD is Merton’s distance to default, REPUTATION is the firm’s reputation score.  The variables are defined 
in Appendix I.   P-values are reported below coefficient estimates.  McFadden pseudo R
2
 values are reported for each 
regression.  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 (1) 
 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Dynamic Logit 
Logit 
Dynamic Logit 
Logit 
Dynamic Logit 
Logit 
Dynamic Logit 
Logit 
Dynamic Logit 
Logit  Failure Failure Failure Failure Failure 
Sample Period: 1983-2007 1983-2007 1983-2007 1983-2007 1983-2007 
PROFITABILITY -37.327
***
 -38.796
***
 -36.142
***
   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
LEVERAGE 2.597
***
 3.842
***
 3.513
***
   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
EXCESS RETURN -11.385
***
 -6.403
***
 -7.478
***
   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
IDIOVOL 2.249
***
 2.266
***
 2.022
***
   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
CASH -0.776 -1.116 -1.077   
 (0.45) (0.44) (0.47)   
MARKET-TO-BOOK -0.109 -0.119 -0.118   
 (0.18) (0.43) (0.43)   
MERTONDD    -0.593
***
 -
 
0.556
***
 
    (0.00) (0.00) 
REPUTATION   -0.463
***
  -0.471
***
 
   (0.00)  (0.00) 
CONSTANT -6.548
***
 -6.929
***
 -3.892
***
 -0.847
***
 1.759
**
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
Observations 17350 3689 3689 3479 3479 
Failures 302 68 68 63 63 
Pseudo R-squared 22.2% 22.6% 24.1% 21.6% 23.4% 
Sample CRSP/Compustat Reputation Reputation Reputation Reputation 
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Appendix I 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Definitions 
SPREAD 
 
Average firm-level monthly credit spread in basis points, calculated over the 12-month 
period from October of year t to September of year t+1. Credit spread is defined as the 
beginning-of-month difference between the yield on a firm’s bond and the yield on the 
corresponding maturity-matched Treasury bond. To compute credit spreads at a firm 
level, a firm’s outstanding bond spreads are averaged each month on a value-weight 
basis using market values of the bonds as weights.    
PROFITABILITY 
 
Geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net income 
(COMPUSTAT quarterly data item: NIQ) to adjusted total assets:   
PROFITABILITYt-1, t-12 = 
1−2
1−12
 (NIMTAt-1,t-3 + … + NIMTAt-10,t-12) 
where, in order to deal with outliers, we adjust total value of assets, TA (COMPUSTAT 
quarterly data item: ATQ), by the difference between market equity (ME) and book 
equity (BE, as defined as in Davis, Fama, and French 2000):   
, , , ,
0.1( )
i t i t i t i t
MTA TA ME BE= + -  
The weighting coefficient is set to  = 2−1/3, such that the weight is halved each quarter. 
LEVERAGE Ratio of total liabilities (data item: NIQ) to adjusted total assets. 
EXCESS 
RETURN 
 
Geometrically declining average of monthly log excess stock returns relative to the S&P 
500 index:    
EXCESS RETURNt-1, t-12 = 
1−
1−12
(EXCESS RETURNt-1 +…+ 
11
EXCESS RETURNt--12) 
The weighting coefficient is set to  = 2−1/3, such that the weight is halved each quarter. 
RETURN Cumulative return over the past year. 
CASH Ratio of cash and short-term investment (data item: CHEQ) to adjusted total assets. 
IDIOVOL Standard deviation of errors obtained from regressing daily excess returns on the Fama 
and French (1993) factors. 
MARKET-TO-
BOOK 
Market-to-book ratio. 
SIZE Market capitalization (measured in millions). 
CHS-Z 
 
CHS z-score is computed as:  
  
CHS-Zt  =  9.164  +  20.264 PROFITABILITYt  –  1.416 LEVERAGEt   
+  7.129 EXCESS RETURNt   –  1.411 SIGMAt  +  0.045 RSIZEt  
+  2.132 CASHt  –  0.075 MARKET TO BOOKt  +  0.058 PRICEt 
 
where SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous three 
months; RSIZE is the log ratio of market capitalization to the market value of the S&P 
500 index; and PRICE is the log price per share truncated at $15 for shares priced above 
$15.   
RATING 
 
Corporate credit rating obtained from Standard and Poor’s.  We follow convention and 
use a numerical rating scale to covert ratings.  The numerical values corresponding to 
rating notches are 1 for AAA,  2 for AA+,  3 for AA, 4 for AA-,  5 for A+,  6 for A,  7 
for A-, 8 for BBB+, 9 for BBB, 10 for BBB-, 11 for BB+, 12 for BB, 13 for BB-, 14 for 
B+, 15 for B, 16 for B-, 17 for CCC+,  18 for CCC, 19 for CCC-, and 20 for CC. 
MOMENTUM Cumulative return over the prior twelve months. 
GOVERNANCE 
 
G-Index developed by Gompers Ishii and Metrick (2003) to measure the extent of 
shareholder rights, ranging from 1 to 24, with 24 indicating the lowest shareholder 
rights. 
INST. Fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional investors, computed as residual 
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OWNERSHIP 
 
institutional ownership following Nagel (2005).  First, we obtain data on institutional 
ownership from the Thomson Financial Institutional Holdings (13F) database.  We sum 
the stock holdings of all reporting institutions for each stock in each year.
12
  We then 
divide each stock’s institutional holdings by total shares outstanding to obtain the 
fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional investors (INST), which yields the 
numbers reported in Tables 1 and 2.  For subsequent analyses conducted in Tables 4 and 
5, we control for potential correlation between firm size and fractional institutional 
ownership.  We regress prior-year fractional institutional ownership on the log of prior-
year firm size. Some transformations, however, are necessary for this regression to be 
well specified. The fraction of institutional ownership (the dependent variable) is 
bounded by 0 and 1. To map it to the real line, we perform a logit transformation, 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇) = 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇
1−𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇
) 
 
where values of INST below 0.0001 and above 0.9999 are replaced with 0.0001 and 
0.9999, respectively.  We then regress Logit(INST) on Log(SIZE) and use the residuals 
of this regression (residual institutional ownership value) in the analyses conducted in  
Tables 4 and 5.  
ANALYST 
 
Number of analysts following a firm, computed as the average number of analysts 
making annual estimates for a firm in a given year. 
HIGH 
COVENANTS 
 
Indicator variable taking a value of 1 if a bond contains more than the median number of 
covenants as described in Section 5.2. 
TOTAL 
COVENANTS 
Total number of covenants in a bond issue as described in Section 5.2. 
FRAUD FLAG 
 
Indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a Securities and Exchange Commission 
enforcement action includes a violation of a securities fraud statue under either the 
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as described in Section 
5.3.  [We assign FRAUD FLAG a value of 1 for all years during which the fraud took 
place as indicated by the SEC investigation.] 
FAILURE Dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if a firm is predicted to be downgraded to 
CCC+ or below by Standard & Poor’s in twelve months, as described in Section 5.4. 
MERTONDD Merton (1974) “distance-to-default” measure computed as the difference between the 
asset value of the firm and the face value of its debt scaled by the standard deviation of 
the firm’s asset value. We follow CHS (2008) and Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and 
Lunstedt (2004) to calculate Merton’s distance-to-default measure.   
 
  
                                                 
12
 Stocks that are on CRSP, but without any reported institutional holdings, are assumed to have zero institutional 
ownership. 
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Appendix II 
Covenant Index Construction 
 
Covenant Indicator  FISD  covenants FISD definition of covenants 
Dividend payment 
Dividends related 
payments  
Flag indicating that payments made to shareholders or other entities 
may be limited to a certain percentage of net income or some other 
ratio 
Subsidiary dividends 
related payments  
Limits the subsidiaries' payment of dividends to a certain 
percentage of net income or some other ratio. For captive finance 
subsidiaries, this provision limits the amount of dividends which 
can be paid to the parent. This provision protects the bondholder 
against a parent from draining assets from its subsidiaries.  
Other payment Restricted payments  
Restricts issuer's freedom to make payment (other than dividend 
related payments) to shareholders and others 
Funded debt 
Subsidiary funded 
debt  
Restricts issuer's subsidiaries from issuing additional funded debt 
(debt with an initial maturity of longer than one year) 
Funded debt  
Restricts issuer from issuing additional funded debt. Funded debt is 
an debt with an initial maturity of one year or longer 
Subordinated debt 
Subordinated debt 
issuance  Restricts issuance of junior or subordinated debt 
Senior debt Senior debt issuance  
Restricts issuer to the amount of senior debt is may issuer in the 
future 
Secured debt 
Negative pledge 
covenant 
The issuer cannot issue secured debt unless it secures the current 
issue on a pari passu basis 
Indebtedness 
Indebtedness  
Restricts user from incurring additional debt with limits on absolute 
dollar amount of debt outstanding or percentage total capital  
Subsidiary 
indebtedness  Restricts the total indebtedness of the subsidiaries 
Leverage test Restricts total-indebtedness of the issuer 
Subsidiary leverage 
test Limits subsidiaries' leverage 
Leaseback 
Sales leaseback  
Restricts issuer to the type or amount of property used in a sale 
leaseback transaction and may restrict its use of the proceeds of the 
sale. A sale leaseback transaction is a method of raising capital in 
which an organization sells some specific assets to an entity that 
simultaneously leases the asset back to the organization for a fixed 
term and agreed upon rate.  
Subsidiary sales 
leaseback  
Restricts subsidiaries from selling then leasing back assets that 
provide security for the debtholder. This provision usually requires 
that assets or cash equal to the property sold and leased back be 
applied to the retirement of the debt in question or used to acquire 
another property to increase the debtholders' security 
Liens 
Liens  
In the case of default, the bondholders have the legal right to sell 
mortgaged property to satisfy their unpaid obligations 
Subsidiary liens  Restricts subsidiaries from acquiring liens on their property 
Guarantee Subsidiary guarantee  
Subsidiary is restricted from issuing guarantees for the payment of 
interest and/or principal of certain debt obligations 
Transaction Transaction affiliates  Issuer is restricted in certain business dealings with its subsidiaries 
Investment  
Investments  Restricts issuer's investment policy to prevent risky investments 
Subsidiary 
investments Restricts subsidiaries' investment 
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unrestricted  
Asset sales 
Asset sale clause  
Covenant requiring the issuer to use net proceeds from the sale of 
certain assets to redeem the bonds at par of at a premium. This 
covenant does not limit the issuers right to sell assets 
Sale assets  
Restriction on the ability of an issuer to sell assets or restrictions on 
the issuer's use of the proceeds from the sale of assets. Such 
restrictions may require the issuer to apply some or all of the sales 
proceeds to the repurchase of debt through a tender offer or call.  
Subsidiary sale assets 
unrestricted  
issuer must use proceeds from sale of subsidiaries' assets (either 
certain asset sales or all asset sales over some threshold) to reduce 
debt. 
Common stock 
Stock issuance  Restricts issuer from issuing additional common stock 
Subsidiary stock 
issuance  
Restricts issuer from issuing additional common stock in restricted 
subsidiaries. Restricted subsidiaries are those which are considered 
to be consolidated for financial test purposes.  
Preferred stock 
Subsidiary preferred 
stock issuance  Restricts subsidiaries' ability to issue preferred stock 
Other stock Stock transfer sale  
Restricts the issuer from transferring, selling, or disposing of its 
own common or the common stock of a subsidiary 
Default 
Cross acceleration  
A bondholder protective covenant that allows the holder to 
accelerate their debt, if any other debt of the organization has be 
accelerated due to an event of default 
Cross default  
A bondholder protective covenant that will activate an event of 
default in their issue, if an event of default has occurred under any 
other debt of the company  
Poison put 
Change control put 
provisions  
Upon a change of control in the issuer, bondholders have the option 
of selling the issue back to the issuer(poison put). Other conditions 
may limit the bondholder's ability to exercise the put option. Poison 
puts are often used when a company fears an unwanted takeover by 
ensuring that a successful hostile takeover bid will trigger an event 
that substantially reduce the value of the company  
Merger  Consolidation merger  
Indicates that a consolidation or merger of the issuer with another 
entity is restricted 
Earnings 
Fixed charge coverage  
Issuer is required to have a ratio of earnings available for fixed 
charges, of at least a minimum specified level.  
Subsidiary fixed 
charge coverage  
Subsidiaries are required to maintain a minimum ratio of net 
income to fixed charges 
Net earnings test 
issuance  
To issue additional debt the issuer must have achieved or 
maintained certain profitability levels. This test is a variations of 
the (more common) fixed coverage tests 
Net worth 
Maintenance net 
worth  Issuer must maintain a minimum specified net worth 
Declining net worth  
If issuer's net worth (as defined) falls below minimum level, certain 
bond provisions are triggered 
Rating decline 
Rating decline trigger 
put  
A decline in the credit rating of the issuer (or issue) triggers a bond 
holder put provision  
 
